Is the Concept of Bildung Still Relevant? Rethinking Bildung From a Praxeological Perspective

Solvejg Jobst
Western Norway University of Applied Sciences, Norway

ABSTRACT
Education is a term that plays a central role in the self-image of modern societies, but it is also one that generates many different associations. The article aims to specify education as a scientific term without negating its complexity and dynamics. In order to underline this multifaceted topic, the term Bildung will be used and examined. The discussion takes as its starting point the assumptions that Bildung is a social phenomenon as well as a process related to the individual, and that both aspects must be linked. This challenge is approached from a praxeological perspective. With reference to practice theory, the article first articulates three basic, interrelated elements of practice. These are then interpreted in terms of educational theory, with the goal of developing a praxeological concept of Bildung. An important conclusion here is that Bildung as practice is relational, pluripotent and generative, and that the emancipatory value of Bildung lies in transgressing the limits of practice. From a habitus-theoretical point of view, it is made clear that this is likely when practice is contradictory and when previous practical rationalities cease to be used. Following these reflections on a praxeological concept of Bildung, the article closes with perspectives on praxeological educational research.

Keywords: practice; emancipation; transgression; habitus; materialism

Introduction: The multi-faceted concept of Bildung
The term “education” and its various translations – such as the German term Bildung, dannning in Norway and Danmark or bildning in Sweden – are central to the self-image of today’s societies, that is, the way different societies construct and understand their past, present, and future. National governments, for example, might claim that they are a “Bildungsrepublik” (Merkel, 2008), or make the term “danning” a central pillar of curriculum reform (for example Utdanningsdirektoratet, 2022), and international organisations refer to education as a “key to development and peace” (UNESCO, 2013). Although the term “education” is used extensively and sets the premises for how a society is shaped, it often remains unclear what is actually meant when it is...
referred to. Some even speak of it as a “fuzzy concept” (Horlacher, 2014) or make reference to the “semantics of helplessness” (Luhmann & Schorr, 1979, p. 83).

Various efforts within the field of research on education have attempted to shed light on this confusion and to systematise the various uses of the term. For example, Gustavsson (2014, p. 109) distinguishes between the classical German tradition, based primarily on Wilhelm von Humboldt (classical Bildung), the liberal Anglo-Saxon classical tradition mostly associated with Martha C. Nussbaum (liberal education) and the hermeneutic tradition, associated with Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoer (critical-hermeneutic Bildung). Sjöström et al. added further traditions to these categories: the Scandinavian folk-Bildung tradition that combines the German notion of Bildung with the usefulness of Bildung for “the creation of society with justice” (2017, p. 170) and democratic education, which goes back to John Dewy and is anchored in the tradition of pragmatism.

Common to all these traditions is the understanding that education describes a complex and processual relationship between the individual and society, though opinions differ as to how this relationship should be defined. Marotzki, for example, places reflection at the centre of his structural theory of Bildung and sees reflection as a “withdrawal from everyday practice” to which one then returns as a different, changed person (1990, p. 48). Bildung, then, is a “reflexive modus of human being-in-the-world” (Marotzki, 2006, p. 50). Following the humanistic Humboldtian tradition of Bildung, other authors emphasise the importance of reflection as well. For example, Biesta points out that through the process of education, individuals build a reflective relationship with society, primarily by developing “a stance towards existing culture and society” (2012, p. 817). Closely related to Bildung as a reflexive process is the focus on language. The manner in which the subject relates to themselves and the world is communicated through language (Koller, 2011, p. 377). Different national languages, sociolects and individual and group-related modes of expression can symbolise different ways of seeing the world, and a variety of languages “allows the self to access new ways of thinking and feeling and thus expands the boundaries of its previous world view” (Koller, 2017, p. 86).

In contrast to works that place reflection at the centre of their theoretical educational considerations, a discourse has developed which draws attention to the implicit elements of the educational process (Geimer, 2012; Nohl, 2006; Rosenberg, 2011). Here, the transformation of the individual’s understanding of the self and the world is reinterpreted as a transformation of the habitus. In this sense, Bildung is regarded as the transformation of a (conjunctive) knowledge that guides actions and is relevant to practice (Nohl, 2006, p. 12).

Alongside the tradition of viewing Bildung as a personal transformation, Bildung is also theorised as a social phenomenon, that is, it is created by society and affects both personal and collective life. Here, too, there are differences in opinion: while structural-functionalist approaches assume that (school-based) educational processes contribute to the inner cohesion of a society (Parsons, 1997); critical studies
Is the Concept of Bildung Still Relevant?

problematising the connection between institutionalised Bildung, social conflicts and power. Such studies focus on both aspects – on the explicit ideological content of schooling (Apple, 1999; Freire, 2017; Wexler, 1982), as well as on hidden educational processes. In this context, Bildung is understood as hegemony (Gramsci, 1991), which positions the subject by triggering processes of discipline (Foucault, 1979) and self-exclusion (Bourdieu, 2001; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1971).

This brief insight into education theory makes it clear that the terms “education” and Bildung are used in a number of different scientific disciplines and national contexts. The further development of this concept can therefore be based on a multifaceted, multidisciplinary wealth of knowledge. At the same time, this means that this knowledge stems from different traditions and semantic frameworks, meaning that the concept of education evokes diverse associations, which can complicate interdisciplinary and international communication. This article attempts to contribute to clarifying the concept without negating its complexity, both in regard to its meaning and in regard to its potential for building bridges.

In order to underline the multifaceted quality of educational processes, the term Bildung is used throughout this article. This is because it is not only about evoking the ideal of a humanist society for which Bildung for all is essential (Klafki 1999), but also about the fact that a complex, comprehensive understanding of Bildung as Bildung for all is the only answer to the challenges of modern society. It is in this sense that the concept of Bildung as discussed in this paper joins the chorus of those many voices that think of Bildung as a counter-concept to the neoliberal discourse on Bildung and society. In other words, those who do not think of Bildung as something that can be measured, sold or planned (compare for example Horlacher, 2014; Liessmann 2017; Løvlie et al., 2003; Sünker & Krüger 1999).

Based on the introductory reflections on different scholarly understandings of Bildung above, this discussion takes as its starting point the assumption that Bildung is both social and individual. It indicates an inner process of personality formation as well as socially institutionalised mechanisms. A central task is to specify the concept of Bildung scientifically and in such a way that both the aforementioned dimensions are connected within it, that both the subjective and the objective dimensions are decentralised in the concept of Bildung and related to each other. This article tackles this challenge in a praxeological manner.

The term “practice” itself is part of an interdisciplinary theoretical movement and is categorised into topics such as “practice theory,” “sociology of practice,” “theory of social practices,” or “praxeology” (for example Nicolini, 2013, p. 1). A central concern of all these understandings is to give weight to the mutual dialectical

---

1 Conversely, however, it must also be said that in Germany, the birthplace of the humanistic concept of Bildung, there was a “semantic shift” after 1945 with the reception of the Anglo-American concept of education, and since then Bildung has not exclusively been perceived in the sense of a subjective process, but increasingly also as a formal qualification (Hörner, 2020, p. 39).
dependence between subject and society. It is precisely in this sense that I want to rethink Bildung through the theoretical view of practice. To start off with, the article outlines the most important elements of practice. These are then interpreted in terms of educational theory, with the goal of developing a praxeological concept of Bildung. Following these reflections, the article closes with perspectives on praxeological educational research.

**Basic elements of practice**

With reference to research within philosophy and sociology (Reckwitz, 2003, 2004; Schäfer, 2017), three basic, interconnected elements of practice can be distinguished. First, practice designates a process of self-activity in the world. It means “what might be called […] ‘doing-ness’ – energeia” or “systematic, socially meaningful ways of getting things done, and actually doing them” (Green et al., 2017, p. 49). Behind this is the basic assumption that humans are not only their own designers, but also those of society, achieved by being active in the world (for example Hurrelmann, 2006; Marx, 1969). Leontjev, who put the concept of activity at the centre of his socio-psychological considerations, goes on to say that the real process of human life should be seen as a “system of activities replacing one another”, and that in the process of activity, a reciprocal transference between the poles of “subject-object” is accomplished (Leontjev, 1982, pp. 44–45).

Second, practice exists in relation to materiality in both the concrete human body and concrete non-human things such as nature or artefacts (computers, books, school buildings or items of clothing). Non-human things and human physicality give practice its specific basic, material structure. Without materiality, without the presence of objects and bodies, practice is not possible. Here, the human body is not regarded merely as an organ that performs, for example, cognitive acts or social norms; instead, like things, it constitutes social practice by means of its very existence (Reckwitz, 2003, p. 290). Furthermore, practice theory stresses that materiality has its own intrinsic logic (for example Schäfer, 2017, p. 12). This is underlined by Lewin who spoke of the stimulative nature (Aufforderungscharakter) of things (Lewin, 1935, in Leontjev, 1982, p. 89) or by Latour who considered things as actors: “Anything that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor” (Latour, 2005, p. 71). One can also refer again to Leontjev, who assumes that one activity differs from another through its object and that this object “gives [the activity] a determined direction” (Leontjev, 1982, p. 54).

Third, practice refers to production and reproduction. With regard to this, Reckwitz specifically states that this relationship forms a conflict line within practice theory. To underline this, he points to the contrasting assumptions of Bourdieu and Butler: while Butler emphasises “the constant disruption of well-rehearsed routines of performance” and thus presupposes the explicitness of rules and intentions; Bourdieu emphasises “reproductivity as the norm” and thus the existence of a pre-rational,
implicit knowledge that can never be grasped by reflection (Reckwitz, 2004, p. 46). This is interesting in terms of educational theory, since the tension between reflection and pre-rational, implicit knowledge is also a central point of contention here, as explained at the start of the article – a point which will be returned to later.

Rethinking Bildung from a praxeological perspective

What can the theory of Bildung learn from the elements of practice briefly outlined above? This question is particularly relevant to the educational field and its disciplines, where there is a long tradition of engagement with practice – a tradition, however, that often sees practice in a dichotomous relationship between abstract theoretical knowledge and situational practices. While there is now a body of research that examines pedagogical practices through a practice-theoretical lens (for example Mahon et al., 2017), “practice” as a theoretical category does not yet have an established place in pedagogy and educational science. This lack of theoretical complexity leads to the perpetuation of the social dichotomies “individual vs. structure” or “object vs. subject” (for example Kemmis, 2009, p. 19; Kemmis & McTaggart, 2000), i.e., to the reproduction of those elements in the discourse of Bildung theory that need to be overcome. Therefore, practice as a theoretical category is linked to the concept of Bildung in the discussion below.

Bildung has its own practical rationality

To understand Bildung as a practice implies first that Bildung has its own practical rationality. This is a rationality which cannot be captured by scholarly abstractions or the semantics of educational policy (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 148). Rather, Bildung is to be understood in relation to what has actually been experienced and “to the needs, interests and necessities of individuals in the context of their social, cultural, economic, and also nature-based embedding” (Jobst, 2014, p. 268). From this, it follows that Bildung can have different modes of existence in relation to the respective, situated practice in which it is conducted, including those that are not represented in academic, political and media discourses. But what does this fundamental praxeological assumption of the flexibility and openness of Bildung mean when it comes to concrete situations?

Bildung as the result of material circumstances

The assumption that Bildung (as practice) has its own practical rationality does not mean that Bildung is arbitrary. On the contrary, Bildung is materially anchored. It is related to social institutions, the artificial world, nature and the human body. Considering the fact that Bildung today largely takes place within educational institutions, institutional analyses form a central aspect of pedagogical practice theory.² Green, for example, writes that “a reconceptualised, fully elaborated theory of ²The institutionalisation of Bildung as we know it today forms a part of nation-building in the context of capitalist societies, where, among other things, it is a matter of producing both citizens and
practice can be readily extended to include a notion of practice-as-institution, which is effectively what practice as such leaves behind, as evidence and as testimony, and as its context of possibility” (Green et al., 2017, pp. 50–53).

The material circumstances of Bildung are not limited to institutional settings but encompass the material world outside them. The general stimulating nature of the material, as previously emphasised in relation to practice theory, is an integral part of pedagogical literature. For example, in Emile, Rousseau describes nature, human beings and things as the three sources of Bildung. He says: “The use that we are taught to make of this development is the education of men; and what we acquire from our own experience about the objects that affect us is the education of things” (Rousseau, 2010, p. 162). It follows that things motivate educational processes, with Rousseau going on to say, particularly with regard to nature, that this cannot be influenced by humans – “we do not know what nature allows us to be” (Kontio, 2012, p. 40).

Last but not least, from a practice theory perspective, Bildung initially takes place in relation to the human body. This idea can also be found in pedagogical concepts which do not see Bildung purely as a matter of the mind, but which take a holistic, comprehensive view. Pestalozzi, for example, saw Bildung of humanity as the Bildung of the “head, heart and hand,” with the “hand” relating to work in a social context like agriculture or industrial or domestic activities (Klafki, 1999, p. 100). The “whole person” and the associated criticism of a purely intellectual understanding of Bildung can be found today in pedagogical as well as sociological educational discourses, such as in Klafki’s concept of Allgemeinbildung or in empirical educational research, where Bildung is seen as part of the milieu-specific lifeworld and its related habitus (Grundmann et al., 2003).

**Bildung as the formation of subjectivity and society – some critical remarks**

The materiality of practice discussed above provides the space for both the productive and reproductive dimensions of Bildung. In the current body of literature, this is mainly discussed in two ways – Bildung is either seen as a formation of the individual’s subjectivity, or Bildung is related to the requirements of society and is seen as an instrument of (re)producing society.

To some extent, analyses of Bildung as the formation of subjectivity build on the transformative understanding found in the humanist tradition of Bildung, which understands Bildung as a transformation of the individual’s self-image and world view (Kokemohr, 2007, p. 14; Koller, 2017, p. 170; Marotzki, 1990, pp. 41–43). These concepts are often criticised for neglecting the social context (Klafki, 2007, p. 48). From a praxeological perspective, it can be concluded that the transformation of the subject is triggered, accelerated or hampered by the materiality of a situated practice. Hence, the formation of subjectivity is not only driven by a subject and

---

a work force. This is ensured by national policies, which provide the legal and financial framework and set educational goals, content or results through curricula.
Is the Concept of Bildung Still Relevant?

that subject’s reflection but is dependent on non-human material and institutional structures and mechanisms, and the habitus which is then materialised in the human body. In this sense, a praxeological view of Bildung does not allow us to anticipate a concrete form of subjectivity in the abstract, detached from concrete practice. Even if the material conditions are known, it is difficult, or even impossible, to form predestined subjects because, as I have shown, things have a logic of their own. We also cannot know what this logic allows us to be, as Rousseau wisely said with regard to the formative power of nature.

The same is true of critical reflections that clearly show that the subjectivity produced in educational practice is not a priori “liberating” or emancipatory, but can also be self-excluding (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1971), conformist (Bernfeld, 1994; Foucault, 1979; Freire, 2017; Gramsci, 1991) or defensive and reproductive (Skrobanek & Jobst, 2010; Willis, 1981). Hence, emancipated subjects do not exist outside of practice, nor outside of societal necessity and possibilities. Indeed, in the words of Gramsci, “one must make freedom out of what is necessary” (Gramsci, 1991, p. 1862).

Theories of Bildung in relation to society define Bildung as a medium for social reproduction as well as a means of creating a just future society. From a praxeological point of view, both views appear problematic in that they are not thought of in relation to a situated practice. Thus, educational concepts with an emancipatory orientation can also have a socially reproductive effect if the autonomy of practice is not recognised. Empirical research shows, for example, that the goal of developing a European consciousness, integrated throughout the curricula can be misrepresented in educational practice as an instrument for promoting a nationalistic awareness (Jobst, 2010). Another finding is that teaching methods conceived as participatory actually reinforce social inequality in their practical implementation (Bernstein, 1990). These examples make it clear that normative top-down strategies – even if they are intended to be emancipatory – can have the opposite effect in and through practice. Following Freire’s line of thought (2017, p. 12), it can be argued that educational concepts that understand the future as something “predetermined” contribute in practice to the reproduction of the existing social order. In the course of their teleological determinism, they anticipate the future without considering the inherent logic of concrete practice (Jobst & Skrobanek, 2023).

**Transgression of practice: The emancipatory potential of Bildung**

If the emancipatory purpose of Bildung turns into the opposite in its practical application, should emancipatory Bildung be abandoned? The answer is no. Deviation from the original intention does not mean that it is impossible to achieve said intention. I would instead like to argue that a praxeological analysis can help to explore the possibilities of the emancipatory potential of Bildung.³

³This is done with an awareness of the critical analyses of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, with which Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) pointed out that Enlightenment, with the enforcement of
In contrast to viewing Bildung as the formation and reproduction of subjectivity and society, the praxeological standpoint opens us up to understanding Bildung in its capacity to transgress the limits of practice. Unlike the understandings of Bildung explored above, Bildung as the transgression of practice is not aimed at individual subjects or at the restructuring of their orientation in relation to the self and the world, nor is it aimed at the fulfilment of societal requirements or ideologies. Rather, from a praxeological point of view, one can say that the potential of Bildung lies in the creation of a new practice. According to practice theory, this can only be the case when the previous practical rationality is interrupted and falls out of use. Only then can emancipatory Bildung unfold as a long, open and unpredictable process. This process of emancipatory Bildung can be conceptualised praxeologically with those assumptions of practice theory that also imply change. I refer here to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, which, in contrast to Reckwitz (2004, p. 46), I interpret more dynamically and in a transformational way (compare Wacquant, 2004).

For the transgression of practice, it is not sufficient to see the world differently than before, to recognise one’s own lack of freedom, or to articulate normative educational directions. Rather, a practice is overcome when this practice is contradictory in terms of habitus theory, when there are lines of conflict between the structured side of the habitus and the other material elements of the practice in which the habitus operates. This can go in two directions.

First, Bildung as transgression of practice can be specified with the hysteresis effect of the habitus – namely as adherence to patterns of thought, perception and action under changing conditions (Bourdieu, 2001, pp. 165; Jobst, 2010, pp. 68–70; Krüger, 2018, p. 15). The retention of habitus-based modes of action under changing social conditions should not be denounced as inflexibility, but can instead be further discussed as an opportunity for “emancipation.” In this sense, (emancipatory) Bildung finds its source in the hysteresis effect of habitus. Bildung can thus be characterised as being shaped by self-consistency and by the habitualised effort to reject societal expectations of assimilation, and to develop a staying power that generates practice (Jobst, 2021, p. 3).

Second, the transgressive power of Bildung can be further defined with reference to the reflecting and future-anticipating habitus. This anticipation cannot result

---

4 To borrow Adorno’s term (1959), these reproductive practices of Bildung can be described as Halbbildung (Adorno, 1959; Heydorn, 1980).
5 As was made clear earlier, Reckwitz (2004) sees Bourdieu as a representative of a reproductive practice theory.
6 These considerations clearly show that the assertion made in transformative research on Bildung that the continuity of a habitus implies an avoidance of Bildung is untenable (Geimer, 2012, p. 286).
from the adoption of an ideology, since, as shown before, this is reproductive, nor is it the result of reflection alone. Rather, emancipatory Bildung happens as a kind of “habitualised reflection,” as a process of becoming aware as embedded in the “practical sense” of practice (Bourdieu, 1993). This idea of thinking of emancipatory Bildung theoretically as something open can also be found in the work of third generation activity theory, as advocated for by Engeström (2015), for example. For him, “expansive learning is learning what is not yet there, that is, learning to master a new way of working while designing and implementing that new way of working” (Engström & Glăveanu, 2012, p. 516). Reference can also be made to the philosopher Bloch (1985) and his “Principle of Hope.” Bloch speaks of an anticipatory consciousness. This does not mean something that has been repressed, but something new that is dawning, something that has never been conscious before (Bloch, 2011). In terms of practice theory, the “structuring structure” in the habitus can be interpreted as the “not-yet-conscious,” distinct from what has been experienced – a kind of reflection that is part of life practice but goes beyond previous experiences (Jobst, 2021, p. 4).

**Conclusion and perspectives for praxeological research on Bildung**

The aim of this article was to conceptualise Bildung as a scientific term that, to a greater extent, takes practice, particularly the “autonomy of practice”, into account. This challenge has been approached from a praxeological perspective. From such a perspective, the emancipatory potential of Bildung lies in the transgression of practice. This praxeological understanding of Bildung differs qualitatively from Bildung understood as the formation of subjectivity or society in that it emphasises a constant, unfinished process of change. This is the case when the previous practical rationality is interrupted and falls out of use. In a habitus-theoretical perspective, this exists when there is a lack of alignment between the structured side of the habitus and the other material elements of the practice in which the habitus operates. The structuring (emancipatory) process which is set in motion here can arise from the hysteresis effect of the habitus, that is, from adhering to patterns of thought, perception and action under changing conditions and assimilation expectations. However, it can also have its roots in the future-anticipating habitus in a kind of reflection that is part of the practice of life but goes beyond actual experience.

How can the praxeological concept of Bildung be researched? Fundamentally, the relational, pluripotent and generative quality of the concept of Bildung also requires a dynamic and procedural research perspective that allows the researcher to look into pioneering and unexpected practices within and outside of the educational system. It recognizes the autonomy of practice as well as the transformative possibilities of educational research, such as exploring spaces that are crucial for change in the educational system in particular and in society in general.
According to Apple (2012, p. 13), these spaces can be referred to as “decentered unities.” The sensitisation of research for such decentralised practical units substantiates the socio-political dimension of Bildung and critical educational research, or critical pedagogy (Sünker, 2003), which has the overarching goal of contributing to the “collective emancipation” of people and society (Klafki, 1976, p. 269). In addition to the critical examination of socio-cultural valuations, e.g., with regard to prefabricated answers to the question of what an educated person should be, praxeological educational research can support various progressive movements (“decentred units”) in their search for a common basis of understanding that serves the practical realisation of emancipatory Bildung (for all). Creating a common basis for communication also serves to promote existing pioneering educational practices with the aim of bringing about far-reaching changes in the educational system.

This research strategy also has the potential to bridge borders. First, it presupposes the removing of disciplinary boundaries, so as to be able to define and work on problems that are relevant to practice without disciplinary limits, and thus trigger a transformation in the classificatory order of academic disciplines (Mittelstraß, 2005, p. 21). Second, the engagement with problems and the search for practice alternatives to tackle them requires collaboration between academia and non-academic fields based on mutual respect, critical self-reflection of one’s own practice and an equitable allocation of resources. With that in mind, the praxeological perspective on Bildung can connect to school development research and action research, where practitioners also play a central role as co-researchers and agents of change (for example, Hollenbach & Tillmann, 2011). In addition, it corresponds to the praxeological assumption of letting the field of practice speak for itself.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that a research strategy based on a praxeological understanding of Bildung can provide an answer to the challenges of today’s fluid society. A key issue here is the constantly changing nature of “subjectivity” and the “formation of society” in the context of globalisation (for example, Bauman, 2000; Giddens, 1990; Skrobanek & Jobst 2019, p. 313). Here, the authority of stability-oriented social concepts and practices is diminishing, which deprives educational institutions in particular of their legitimacy to contribute to a stable society and secure biographical future prospects. At the same time, the reproduction of social inequalities through national educational systems continues, and the alliance between neoliberal politics and egalitarian ideology makes it even more difficult to shape social change in an emancipatory manner (for example, Jobst, 2013; Skarpenes, 2014). Against this background, the emancipatory power of the praxeological concept of Bildung lies in combating the restrictions on Bildung for all, while at the same time responding to uncertain social change by placing itself neither above nor next to the dynamics of society, but by entering into a generative relationship with these dynamics.
Is the Concept of Bildung Still Relevant?

Author biography

Solvejg Jobst is a professor of education at Western Norway University of Applied Sciences. She researches and teaches educational theory, education and social inequality, practice theory, intercultural pedagogy, teacher research, theory of science, and educational sociology. Some of her latest publications in the field of pedagogy and criticism are Cultural hegemony and intercultural educational research (2020), The Principle of Hope: Bloch’s contribution to the praxiological understanding of education (2021) or Researching ‘liquid integration’ (2022).

References


288
Is the Concept of Bildung Still Relevant?


